Ukraine, they have this to gain - that if chaos does erupt, they will be able to play the role
      of prophets who foretold its coming, and they will do this quite overlooking that they helped it
      come.
      CONTENTS:
      Preface
      The Galicia Division
      Quality of Translation
      Ukrainian Homogeneity
      Were Ukrainians Nazis?
      Simon Wiesenthal
      What Happened in Lviv?
      Nazi Propaganda Film
      Collective Guilt
      Paralysis of the Comparative
      Function
      60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
      Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
      Jewish Ukrainophobia
      Mailbag
      A Sense of Responsibility
      What 60 Minutes Should Do
      PostScript
      What 60 Minutes Should Do
      (1) 60 Minutes owes its viewers a detailed correction, a retraction, an apology. The product
      was defective, it is dangerous, it must be recalled.
      Acknowledging that Ukrainians are upset or that they are protesting is not a correction, it is
      not a retraction, and it is not an apology. Directing attention to Ukrainian feelings is 60
      Minutes' way of deflecting attention away from its own negligence.
      60 Minutes has valiantly investigated and exposed hundreds of corrupt, or merely erring, people
      and institutions - the time has come to turn the focus inwards and to investigate and expose
      itself. Of course this can only be done objectively by an external investigator relying on his
      or her own independent staff. Inviting such an external investigator to do a 60 Minutes story
      is the right thing to do; it will be appreciated and admired; it will raise 60 Minutes'
      integrity from its currently lowered position to a new pinnacle. Damage control won't work. If
      60 Minutes really wants respect, it should broadcast a story on itself and call it "The Ugly
      Face of 60 Minutes."
      As the misinformation that was planted in the original twelve-minute segment will take longer
      than twelve minutes to uproot, 60 Minutes should devote an entire nominal sixty minutes to its
      correction, retraction, and apology - only such a substantial allocation of time can begin to
      undo the damage. At the other extreme, a correction, retraction, and apology confined to
      Mailbag will be next to worthless.
      (2) 60 Minutes should upgrade its research library by acquiring at least the two-volume
      Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, the five-volume Encyclopaedia of Ukraine, Orest Subtelny's
      Ukraine: A History, and Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European Jews. This seems a
      modest investment to plug a huge and dangerous gap in awareness.
      (3) But books are nothing if they are sitting on the shelves of biased researchers. Find out
      who contributed to the travesty of "The Ugly Face of Freedom" and get rid of them. And don't
      worry about their careers - with their special talents, they will be able to get good jobs with
      supermarket tabloids writing about sightings of Elvis Presley and UFO landings.
      (4) 60 Minutes should examine with a more skeptical eye materials concerning Ukrainians, and
      concerning Eastern Europeans generally, that come from biased sources. As a minimal step, 60
      Minutes could adopt the rule of thumb that anyone who considers Eastern Europeans to be
      sub-human might better be assigned to some other topic.
      (5) 60 Minutes should not be afraid to consult sources capable of balancing a biased story.
      There are a large number of historians and other academics (some of whom are Ukrainian or East
      European, some of whom are Jewish, some of whom are both, some of whom are neither) that could
      have told 60 Minutes at a glance that "The Ugly Face of Freedom" was bunkum.
      (6) 60 Minutes should rethink its heavy-handed reliance on the gimmick of interviewing by
      ambush by means of which the side favored by 60 Minutes is apprised in advance of the nature of
      the interview, has a chance to organize his thoughts, and comes out looking good whereas the
      side ambushed is misled into believing that the interview will be supportive, but then is hit
      with questions that are hostile and for which he is unprepared. The ambushed interviewee is
      discomposed, flustered, fumbles in trying to collect his thoughts, the camera zooms in on his
      confusion, and he appears duplicitous. It may be a tried-and-true formula, but it doesn't fool
      every viewer and constitutes poor journalism in the case where the interviewee is innocent,
      where he would have granted the interview even if he hadn't been misled as to its intent, and
      where nothing more damning is extracted from him other than his consternation at having been
      betrayed.
      (7) In order to permit the viewer to verify the accuracy of a 60-Minutes translation, the
      original statement should remain audible and not be muted to the point of unintelligibility, and
      transcripts provided by 60 Minutes should include the original of any statements that had been
      broadcast in translation.
      (8) 60 Minutes should rely on professional translators with accredited competence in the
      original language who might be counted on to provide an undistorted translation. Particularly,
      60 Minutes should expect that if it relies on a Russian who merely claims that he understands
      Ukrainian, it is inviting the sort of biased mistranslation that it did in fact get in its
      broadcast.
      (9) 60 Minutes should not tackle a complex, multi-faceted story unless it is willing to invest
      sufficient resources to get it right. In a typical 60 Minutes story say the exposing of a
      single corrupt individual - the number of issues involved, and the amount of data that is
      relevant, is small, can be gathered with a modest research outlay, and can readily be contained
      within a 12-minute segment. "The Ugly Face of Freedom," in contrast, presented conclusions on a
      dozen topics any one of which would require the full resources of a single typical 60 Minutes
      story to present fairly - and so, little wonder that most of these conclusions turned out to be
      wrong.
      (10) 60 Minutes should heighten its awareness of the distinction between raw data and
      tenth-hand rumor. A hospital administrator examining a document and explaining how he knows
      that it is a forgery is raw data from which 60 Minutes might be justified in extracting some
      conclusion; that Symon Petliura slaughtered 60,000 Jews is a tenth-hand rumor which 60 Minutes
      is incompetent to evaluate and which might constitute disinformation placed by a
      special-interest group intent on hijacking a story and forcing it to travel in an unwanted
      direction.
      (11) 60 Minutes should ask Mr. Safer to resign. Mr. Safer's conduct was unprofessional,
      irresponsible, vituperative. Mr. Safer has demonstrated an inability to distinguish impartial
      reporting from rabid hatemongering and as a result has no place in mainstream journalism. He
      has lost his credibility.
      Mr. Safer, too, will be welcomed by the supermarket tabloids where he will find the heavy burden
      of logic and consistency considerably lightened, and the constraints of having to make his words
      correspond to the facts mercifully relaxed.
      (12) 60 Minutes should do a story on Simon Wiesenthal and assign it to a reporter and to
      researchers who have the courage to consider objectively such politically-incorrect but arguable
      conclusions as that Mr. Wiesenthal's stories are self-contradictory and fantastic, that his
      denunciations have sometimes proven to be irresponsible, and that he spent the war years as a
      Gestapo agent.
      CONTENTS:
      Preface
      The Galicia Division
      Quality of Translation
      Ukrainian Homogeneity
      Were Ukrainians Nazis?
      Simon Wiesenthal
      What Happened in Lviv?
      Nazi Propaganda Film
      Collective Guilt
      Paralysis of the Comparative
      Function
      60 Minutes' Cheap Shots
      Ukrainian Anti-Semitism
      Jewish Ukrainophobia
      Mailbag
      A Sense of Responsibility
      What 60 Minutes Should Do
      PostScript
      PostScript
      A discussion relevant to the above critique concerns third-party attempts to incite
      Ukrainian-Jewish animosity and can be found within the Ukrainian Archive at Ukrainian
      Anti-Semitism: Genuine and Spontaneous or Only Apparent and Engineered? The relevance lies in
      the fact that The Ugly Face of 60 Minutes which you have just read above has been the target of
      a crude attempt at anti-Semitization, and at the discreditation of the author, myself, as is
      documented particularly at Lubomyr Prytulak: Enemies of Ukraine anti-Semitize The Ugly Face of
      60 Minutes.
      HOME DISINFORMATION 60 MINUTES
      HOME DISINFORMATION PETLIURA 1441 hits since 23Mar99
      Symon Petliura An Introduction
      Long after Symon Petlura had gone into exile and was living in Paris, armed
      resistance broke out again and again in his name in Ukraine. Indeed, even today his
      name is still regarded by the Ukrainian masses as the symbol of the fight for freedom.
      Symon Petliura: An Introduction
      Is Symon Petliura the man who "slaughtered 60,000 Jews"? Symon Petliura is
      relevant to the Ukrainian Archive primarily because he led the fight for Ukrainian
      independence at the beginning of the twentieth century, and secondarily because
      Morley Safer in his infamous 60 Minutes broadcast of 23Oct94, The Ugly Face of
      Freedom, summed him up this way:
      Street names have been changed. There is now a Petliura Street.
      To Ukrainians, Symon Petliura was a great General, but to Jews,
      he's the man who slaughtered 60,000 Jews in 1919.
      Or is Symon Petliura a fighter for Ukrainian independence? But as the documents
      in this PETLIURA section will begin to suggest, Safer's contemptuous dismissal is not
      quite accurate and does not quite tell the whole story. We can begin with a few
      short excerpts to provide background on Petliura from his entry in the Encyclopedia
      of Ukraine:
      Petliura, Symon [...] b 10 May 1879 in Poltava, d 25 May 1926 in
      Paris. Statesman and publicist; supreme commander of the UNR Army
      and president of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic.
      (T. Hunczak in Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine,
      1993, Volume III, p. 856)
      After the signing of the UNR-Polish Treaty of Warsaw in April 1920,
      the UNR Army under Petliura's command and its Polish military ally
      mounted an offensive against the Bolshevik occupation in Ukraine.
      The joint forces took Kiev on 7 May 1920 but were forced to retreat
      in June. Thereafter Petliura continued the war against the
      Bolsheviks without Polish involvement. Poland and Soviet Russia
      concluded an armistice in October 1920, and in November the major UNR
      Army formations were forced to retreat across the Zbruch into
      Polish-held territory and to submit to internment.
      (T. Hunczak in Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine,
      1993, Volume III, p. 856)
      In late 1923, faced with increased Soviet demands that Poland hand
      him over, he was forced to leave for Budapest. From there he went to
      Vienna and Geneva, and in late 1924 he settled in Paris. In Paris he
      founded the weekly Tryzub, and from there he oversaw the activities
      of the UNR government-in-exile until his assassination by a
      Bessarabian Jew claiming vengeance for Petliura's purported
      responsibility for the pogroms in Ukraine (see Schwartzbard Trial).
      He was buried in Montparnasse Cemetery.
      (T. Hunczak in Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine,
      1993, Volume III, p. 856)
      The above reference to Petliura's assassin being motivated by Jewish vengeance can be
      taken in two ways: literally or as part of Kremlin-manufactured plot.
      Assassinated by a Jew? In the first case, if the assassination was indeed the
      work of a lone Jew longing for vengeance, then it might not be amiss to wonder
      whether there has ever been any great Jewish leader who has been assassinated by a
      Ukrainian for wrongs committed by Jews against Ukrainians, or for any other reason
      for that matter. If not, and I think not, then one might wonder also what the
      respective statistics might be for all cross-ethnic assassinations of leaders and
      officials of not only the highest rank, but of any rank as well, and to wonder
      finally whether any differences in such statistics might be attributable to a
      differential incitement to vengeance within Jewish and Ukrainian cultures.
      Or assassinated by the Kremlin? However, crediting Bessarabian watchmaker,
      Yiddish poet, and assassin Shalom Schwartzbard's claim that he murdered Petliura to
      satisfy a Jewish longing for vengeance is possibly to be taken in by Kremlin
      disinformation, as the following passage explains (where the spelling becomes
      "Schwarzbart"):
      According to Bolshevist misinformation, the Jews are to blame for the
      murder of Petlura. [...]
      The choice of the person who was to commit the murder has always
      served as the basis for the invention of lies and legends about the
      actual murder itself. They have always chosen persons to whom - in
      the event of their arrest - credible tales about motives other than
      the orders of the Kremlin, motives of a personal or political
      character, could be imputed, so as to conceal the fact from the court
      that the order to murder was issued by Moscow.
      In the case of Petlura, a Jew, Schwarzbart, was instructed by Moscow
      to carry out the murder. He received orders to give himself up of
      his own accord to the police as a Communist agent, in order to start
      a political trial in this way. Thus there was a two-fold purpose
      behind this murder: to murder Petlura who was a danger to the
      Bolsheviks, and to direct the political trial of this murder in such
      a way that the person of Petlura and the Ukrainian government which
      he represented, as well as the national liberation movement, which
      was a danger to Moscow, could be defamed from the political point of
      view. It was Schwarzbart's task during this trial to conceal the
      part played by the Russian GPU in this murder and to pose as a
      national avenger of the Jewish people for the brutal pogroms
      committed against them by various anarchist groups, who operated in
      Ukraine during the years of the revolution, that is from 1919 to
      1921, and in the interests of Russia also fought against the
      Ukrainian state. The blame for the pogroms carried out by these
      groups was to be imputed to Petlura. By planning the trial in this
      way the Russians managed to gain a two-fold success. In the first
      place, they succeeded in winning over most of the Jews in the world
      for the defence of the Communist agent Schwarzbart and in arousing
      anti-Ukrainian feelings, which, incidentally, persisted a long time,
      amongst the Jews, and, secondly, as a result of the unjust verdict of
      the Paris court, the Russians and other enemies of an independent
      Ukraine were able to obtain "the objective judgement of an impartial
      court in an unprejudiced state," which could then be used in
      anti-Ukrainian propaganda. For years the Russians made use of this
      judgement in order to defame Petlura in the eyes of the world and to
      misrepresent the Ukrainian state government which he represented and
      the Ukrainian liberation movement as an anti-Semitic, destructive and
      not a constructive state movement, which would be capable of ensuring
      human democratic freedoms to the national minorities in Ukraine. The
      jury of the Paris court, who consisted for the most part of
      supporters of the popular front at that time and of socialist
      liberals, refused to believe the testimony of the numerous witnesses
      of various nationalities, which clearly proved that Petlura had
      neither had any share in the pogroms against the Jews, nor could be
      held in any way responsible for them. They ignored the actual facts
      of the murder, and by their acquittal of the murderer rendered
      Bolshevist Moscow an even greater service than it had expected. Thus
      Moscow scored two successes. But it did not score a third, for the
      Paris trial did not help Moscow to change the anti-Russian attitude
      of the Ukrainians into an anti-Semitic one or to conceal its
      responsibility for the murder of Petlura from the Ukrainians.
      (Anonymous, Murdered by Moscow: Petlura - Konovalets - Bandera,
      Ukrainian Publishers Limited, London, 1962, pp. 8-9)
      Three reflections arise from the Schwartzbard assassination:
      (1) Juror historians. One wonders whether the jurors in a criminal case are
      competent to arrive at a fair determination of historical truth, or whether they are
      more likely to bring with them personal convictions of historical truth which are
      likely to be unshaken by the evidence.
      (2) French justice. The acquittal of a self-confessed assassin might be an outcome
      peculiar to French justice. Other Western states might more typically require the
      conviction of a self-confessed assassin, and consult his motives only to assist in
      determining the severity of sentence. A comment which in part reflects on the French
      acquittal:
      It is a strange paradox that the once so sacred right of asylum, even
      for the spokesmen of hostile ideologies and political trends,
      nowadays does not even include the protection of the fundamental
      rights of life of the natural allies of the West in the fight against
      the common Russian Bolshevist world danger.
      (The Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN),
      Munich, December 1961, in Anonymous, Murdered by Moscow: Petlura
      Konovalets - Bandera, Ukrainian Publishers Limited, London, 1962, p.
      65)
      (3) True-believer assassins. If an assassin is sent by the Kremlin, then is it
      necessary for the Kremlin to find one who is personally committed to the
      assassination? The answer is yes. This is because a Soviet assassin sent to Paris
      has some opportunity to defect and to seek political asylum. He might choose to do
      so to escape totalitarianism, to raise his standard of living, to avoid going through
      with the assassination, and in the Petliura case to avoid the punishment that was
      being anticipated from the French courts. On top of that, he must realize that once
      he has carried out the assassination, he becomes a potential witness against the
      Kremlin, and so might find the Kremlin rewarding him with a bullet to the back of his
      head for the success of his mission.
      Thus, it is essential for the Kremlin to ensure that the assassin be energized with a
      zealous committment to his mission. One way to achieve such committment is to hold
      his family hostage. Another way is to incite in him a thirst for revenge based on
      wrongs done to his people. Thus, even if the Kremlin did order the assassination of
      Petliura, and even if the Kremlin's selection of a Jew to perform the assassination
      was for the political reasons outlined in the quotation above, it may nevertheless be
      true that a Jewish thirst for revenge played a useful role, and that all the Kremlin
      had to do to inspire the requisite motivation was to propose the disinformation that
      Petliura was the appropriate target of that revenge.
      Pogromist or fighter for independence? The Encyclopedia of Ukraine entry ends
      with:
      [S]ince the mid-1920s he has personified, perhaps more than any other
      person, the struggle for Ukrainian independence. The personification
      seemingly also extends to the issue of the pogroms that took place in
      Ukraine during the revolutionary period of 1918-1920, and Petliura
      has frequently been invested with the responsibility for those acts.
      Petliura's own personal convictions render such responsibility highly
      unlikely, and all the documentary evidence indicates that he
      consistently made efforts to stem pogrom activity by UNR troops. The
      Russian and Soviet authorities also made Petliura a symbol of
      Ukrainian efforts at independence, although in their rendition he was
      a traitor to the Ukrainian people, and his followers (Petliurites)
      were unprincipled opportunists.
      (T. Hunczak in Danylo Husar Struk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine,
      1993, Volume III, p. 857)
      A continuing threat to the Kremlin. Petliura's leadership of the fight for
      Ukrainian independence did not end with his withdrawal from the field of battle:
      Long after Symon Petlura had gone into exile and was living in Paris,
      armed resistance broke out again and again in his name in Ukraine.
      Indeed, even today his name is still regarded by the Ukrainian masses
      as the symbol of the fight for freedom [...].
      (Dr. Mykola Kovalevstky, in Anonymous, Murdered by Moscow: Petlura
      Konovalets - Bandera, Ukrainian Publishers Limited, London, 1962, p.
      28)
      However real the continuing resistance that was carried on in Petliura's name, the
      Russian and Soviet authorities - in order to justify Cheka executions
      indiscriminately cited Petliura as the author of real and imagined anti-Soviet
      actions. For example, summarizing the year 1921 alone, historian Sergey Petrovich
      Melgunov relates:
      Particularly large was the number of Petlura "conspiracies" then
      discovered. In connection with them sixty-three persons (including a
      Colonel Evtikhiev) were shot in Odessa, batches of fourteen and
      sixty-six in Tiraspol, thirty-nine in Kiev (mostly members of the
      intelligentsia), and 215 in Kharkov - the victims in the latter case
      being Ukrainian hostages slaughtered in retaliation for the
      assassination of certain Soviet workers and others by rebels. And,
      similarly, the Izvestia of Zhitomir reported shootings of twenty-nine
      co-operative employees, school teachers and agriculturalists who
      could not possibly have had anything to do with any Petlura
      "conspiracy" in the world.
      (Sergey Petrovich Meglunov, The Red Terror in Russia, London, 1925,
      pp. 88-89)
      Thus, if the impression gleaned from the Shapoval volume is correct (to the effect
      that the control of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD lay overwhelmingly in the hands of Jews), then
      the situation might be summarized by saying that even while Jews were in reality
      pogromizing Ukrainians throughout Ukraine (as we saw in the Melgunov quotation
      immediately above), they were simultaneously pogromizing Ukrainian leaders in the
      diaspora, as by the assassinations of, among others, Symon Petliura (1926) in Paris
      by Cheka agent Schwartzbard employing a handgun, of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets (1938)
      in Rotterdam by GPU agent Valyukh employing a package bomb, of Lev Rebet (1957) as
      well as Stepan Bandera (1959) both in Munich and both by KGB agent Bohdan Stashynsky
      employing a poison pistol loaded with cyanide. This same Bohdan Stashynsky
      eventually defected to the West where he confessed to the two above assassinations,
      thereby demonstrating the reasonableness of the distrust that the Kremlin might feel
      toward its own assassins, as well as the reasonableness of the unease that the
      assassins might feel concerning being distrusted.
      Cause and effect. As is often the case with respect to historical events, the
      thread of cause and effect is difficult to untangle. When Petliura makes the
      following statement in his Army Order No. 131, he assumes that pogroms cause an
      opposition to Ukrainian independence:
      Our many enemies, external as well as internal, are already profiting
      by the pogroms; they are pointing their fingers at us and inciting
      against us saying that we are not worthy of an independent national
      existence and that we deserve to be again forcefully harnessed to the
      yoke of slavery.
      However, it is also plausible that causality proceeds in the opposite direction
      that Jewish opposition to Ukrainian independence causes pogroms. Of course, the
      causal link can act in both directions simultaneously, with pogroms and opposition
      each fuelling the other in an escalating spiral. Who might start such a spiral and
      who might encourage it? Petliura views the pogroms not as spontaneous, but as
      incited by "adventurers" and "provocateurs." If he is right, then we may ask who
      might have sent these adventurers and provocateurs? Who might have been paying them
      to do their work? Perhaps the answer is those who might have preferred to absorb
      chunks of a dismembered Ukraine rather than coexisting with an independent Ukraine
      most particularly, Russia and Poland. And perhaps those who wanted to increase
      emigration of Jews out of Ukraine - the Zionists. Russia, Poland, and Zionism
      benefitted from pogroms on Ukrainian territory. All who wanted to live peacefully in
      Ukraine - whether they were Ukrainians or Jews - suffered from the pogroms.
      To see the links to the documents in the Petliura section, please click on the
      PETLIURA link below.
      Borys Martos Government Proclamation 12Apr1919 The scum of humanity
      Above all the Government will not tolerate any pogroms against the
      Jewish population in the Ukraine, and will employ every available means
      for the purpose of combating these abject criminals, dangerous to the
      State, who are disgracing our nation in the eyes of all the civilized nations
      of the world.
      Borys Martos (1879-1977) was a Ukrainian political
      leader, co-operative organizer, and educator.
      From a Government Proclamation
      To the People of the Ukraine
      Riwne, April 12, 1919
      To preserve the peace and to maintain public law and order - as the first
      condition of a free life for all citizens of the Ukrainian Democratic
      Republic - the Ukrainian Government will fight with all its power against
      violations of public order, will strike the brigands and pogrom
      instigators with the severest punishment and expose them publicly. Above
      all the Government will not tolerate any pogroms against the Jewish
      population in the Ukraine, and will employ every available means for the
      purpose of combating these abject criminals, dangerous to the State, who
      are disgracing our nation in the eyes of all the civilized nations of the
      world.
      The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic is certain that the
      Ukrainian people - who themselves have suffered national slavery through
      many years and are conscious of the worth of national freedom and
      therefore proclaimed before all things the national-personal autonomy of
      the minorities in the Ukraine - will support the Ukrainian Government in
      eliminating these evil-doers who are the scum of humanity.
      HOME DISINFORMATION PETLIURA 625 hits since 23Mar99
      Arnold Margolin The Jewish Chronicle 16May1919 Interview on Petliura
      The pogroms have been perpetrated by the people of the Black Hundred
      and by provocateurs for the purpose of discrediting the Ukrainian
      government.
      An Interview with
      Dr. Arnold Margolin in 1919
      The Jewish Chronicle
      London
      May 16, 1919
      Dr. Arnold Margolin, Head of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in London,
      Chairman of the "Jewish Territorial Society" in the Ukraine, was born in
      Kiev (in 1877), attended Kiev University, and established himself in Kiev
      as an attorney. Since 1903 he had been noted as a counsel for the
      defense of the injured in pogrom excesses. Besides, he participated as a
      counsel for the defense in many agrarian and political court trials. For
      his revelations in the well-known Beilis case he was prosecuted by the
      Minister of Justice of that time, Shcheglovitov, with the result that the
      further practice of law was forbidden to him. He has taken part in the
      Ukrainian Movement for many years, and has occupied himself with social
      problems in the Ukraine. After the Revolution he was a member of the
      Central Committee of the Socialist-Federalist Party, and for a time he
      was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the spring of 1919 he went
      to Paris as a member of the Ukrainian Peace Delegation. Since January
      1920 he has been the head of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in London.
      
      What is the attitude of the Jews toward the new Ukrainian State?